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Rate filing policies for inland water transportation: 
an experimental approach 
James T. Hong* 
and 
Charles R. Plott** 
This study uses laboratory experiments to explore the possible consequences of a pro-
posed rate publication policy for the domestic, dry bulk commodity transportation 
industry on inland waterways. The central problem is to determine the effects of a 
requirement that a carrier must.file a proposed rate change with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission at least fifteen days before the rate change is to become effective. The 
study concludes that in laboratory markets that have many of the essential economic 
features of the barge industry, rate filing policies cause higher prices, lower volume, 
and reduced efficiency, and they hurt the small participants. Claims that rate filing 
policies would improve the operations of markets with these economic features are not 
supported by the laboratory research conducted to date. 
1. Introduction 
• Within recent years several programs of rate publication have been proposed for the 
transportation of domestic dry bulk commodities on inland waters (referred to here as 
the barge industry). At issue in such programs is a requirement that if a "for-hire" 
carrier wishes to change its rates, it must file with the ICC before the rate change is to 
become effective (typically a fifteen-day period is proposed). Currently, rates on tows 
are set through individual negotiations, and the terms of each contract are, necessarily, 
known only to the contracting parties. 
The full consequences of a rate filing policy are unknown. Plausible theoretical 
arguments can be made on both sides of the policy argument. When existing theory does 
not yield a definitive answer, one can usually turn to previous experiences with policies, 
but in this case we are aware of no industrial case study that would provide direct 
evidence on either side of the controversy. Some experience with the effects of price 
posting policies has been gained by studying the behavior and performance of laboratory 
markets. In particular, studies by Williams (197 3) and Plott and Smith (1978) provide 
instances where markets characterized by posted price policies are less efficient and 
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induce higher prices than do oral auction markets, although whether this persists at 
equilibrium levels is unknown. 
Any extrapolation from published experimental results to the barge industry itself 
is open to two potential criticisms, the reasonableness of which this study was designed 
to assess. First, the barge industry has several prominent economic features that are not 
incorporated in existing laboratory market studies. Examples include the relative sizes 
of buyers and sellers, the demand and supply elasticities, and the cyclical nature of 
demand. Naturally, we can never be certain that all the important features have been 
included in the present design. If something important has been misspecified or omitted, 
then the observed behavior of the laboratory market may not extend to the barge industry, 
and additional appropriately modified experiments can be conducted as checks on our 
conclusions. The second potential criticism is that the effects of price posting in laboratory 
studies have only been measured relative to the performance of oral auction markets. 
Since auction markets differ from the negotiated price markets of the industry, the 
relevance of the comparison can be questioned. 
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 the experimental design and pro-
cedures are reviewed. The parameter values for all experiments are given in Section 3. 
Then, in Section 4, the parameter values of the laboratory market are compared with 
those of the industry. The experimental results are presented in Section 5, and Section 
6 summarizes the conclusions. 
2. Experimental design 
• A total of 33 subjects agreed to participate in experiments for three hours per night 
for four nights. They were told that they would earn approximately $80 each over the 
four-night period. Subjects included engineers from Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Caltech 
faculty members, secretaries, housewives, and graduate students in engineering, business, 
and law, and some Caltech undergraduates. 
Subjects were randomly given a subject number which keyed them to an incentive 
structure for each of four experimental sessions. A different experimental session was 
held each night. Instructions were read, and a comprehension test on the use of the forms 
was given on the first night. (See Appendix.) Earnings were paid in cash at the end of 
the last session. Subjects were told that only those who participated in all sessions would 
be paid unless they found someone to replace them. 
Experimental sessions were held in Baxter Hall at the California Institute of Tech-
nology from 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and the following 
Monday. Subjects were assigned randomly to faculty offices and, for the most part, were 
alone in the office for the duration of the experiment. Exceptions occurred when a spouse 
or a friend would show up with a sandwich. Some subjects brought additional work or 
books with them which occupied their time during "slack" periods. Contact between 
subjects was minimized between session periods, although face-to-face chatter did occur 
occasionally when subjects met at the restroom, fountain, or Coke machine. Some sub-
jects knew other subjects, but experimenter observations and postexperimental debrief-
ings substantiate the conclusions that little or no contact existed between subjects aside 
from that permitted by the experimental design. 1 
Each experimental session was organized into a series of market periods or days. 
For each period each subject buyer (seller) had a schedule of limit prices, which dictated 
the maximum (minimum) prices the subject could pay (receive) for each unit. All profits 
1 There is one major exception which resulted from the failure of a subject to return after the first evening. 
To preserve the proper number of subjects, we permitted the wife of a subject to take the place of the missing 
individual. Subsequent data analysis, previous experiments, and subsequent experiments indicate that this 
substitution had no measurable effect. 
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made by buying (selling) below (above) the limit price were the subject's to keep. 2 These 
schedules differed among subjects and could differ between periods for the same subject. 
Discussions of limit prices were prohibited. Collusion and side payments were strictly 
forbidden. 
Each subject was seated in an office with a phone. Before the subject was a list of 
all other subjects and their phone numbers and a pad of incentive sheets stapled together 
so the subject could see the redemption values or cost for only the past and the imme-
diately upcoming period. When the period opened (this was signaled by a loud horn), 
each subject was free to call any other subject and engage in whatever transactions 
possible. Conversations could range over any topic whatsoever other than price collusion 
or profit splitting. Subjects were free to reveal, lie, or say nothing about the deals made 
with other subjects. No one could buy and resell units to other subjects. Whenever a 
deal was made in the laboratory markets, both parties in effect signed a contract by 
repeating a short ritual over the phone and recording the terms in their individual record 
sheets. Periods lasted 15 minutes for the first few and then 12 minutes each after that. 
At the end of a period, signaled by a horn, all trading and telephoning stopped. Subjects 
calculated their profits and examined the incentive sheet for the next period. After the 
final period, subjects calculated their total profits and left all materials with the exper-
imenter when they went home for the evening. 
Two different modes of organization were studied. Experimental sessions l and 4, 
held respectively on the first and last evenings, involved negotiated price markets. Ex-
perimental sessions 2 and 3, held respectively on the second and third nights, involved 
posted price markets. Aside from these different modes of organization, the experimental 
settings are substantially identical. 
The negotiated price markets can best be understood by contrast with an auction 
market. In the latter all bids, offers, and contracts are observed by all market participants. 
Negotiated price markets differ since only the two parties engaged in negotiation can 
be fully aware of the terms discussed and agreed upon. They may tell others about 
contract terms, but the quality of such information is subject to no controls. Furthermore, 
information about market transactions is costly to obtain in a telephone market, since 
the time used to gather information could be used for buying and for selling. 
The posted price markets differed in one major respect. After sellers studied the 
cost schedule for an upcoming period, each would privately post with the experimenter 
the price(s) she/he would charge during the upcoming period. Once all sellers had 
registered their prices with the experimenter (by phone or by a carrier that circulated 
to gather prices), a price list was photocopied and distributed to all subjects before a 
period opened. When the period opened, at the sound of a horn, any subject was free 
to call any other subject and make a purchase or sale at the price posted by the seller 
involved in the deal. 
3. Laboratory market parameters 
• An overview of the parameters for all experimental sessions is contained in Table 
l . The market organizations in sessions l through 4 were negotiated prices, posted prices, 
posted prices, and negotiated prices, respectively. The demand and supply functions can 
be explained by reference to the functions used in the first periods of session one, the 
"basic" market demand and supply functions D(x) and S(x) shown in Figure l. To 
minimize any possible effects of expectations from session to session, demand and supply 
functions differed by a constant across sessions. In all experiments demand was held 
initially constant through period four, shifted upward by $.60 for four periods, and 
2 See Smith ( 1976) and Plott ( 1979) for a discussion of limit prices and induced preferences. 
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TABLE I Overview of Laboratory Market Parameters 
Session I Session 2 
Day (all at 7-10 PM) Tuesday Wednesday 
Organization Negotiated Price Posted Price 
Parameters 
Supply S(x)* S(x) + $3.70 
Low Demand Value D(x)* D(x) + $3.70 
Periods 0, I, 2, 3, 4 I , 2, 3, 4, 9, 10 
Equilibrium Price $2.70 $6.40 
Equilibrium Volume 21 21 
High Demand Value D(x) + $.60 D(x) + $3.70 + $.60 
Periods 5, 6, 7 5, 6, 7, 8 
Equilibrium Price $3.00 $6.70 
Equilibrium Volume 27 27 
*The functions S(x) and D(x) are graphed in Figure I. 
Session 3 
Thursday 
Posted Price 
S(x) + $1.10 
D(x) + $1.10 
I , 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 , 12 
$3.80 
21 
D(x) + $1.10 + $.60 
5, 6, 7, 3 
$4.10 
27 
Session 4 
Monday 
Negotiated Price 
S(x) + $4.80 
D(x) + $4.80 
I, 2, 3, 4, 9, JO, 11, 12 
$7.50 
21 
D(x) + $4.80 + $.60 
5, 6, 7, 8 
$7.80 
27 
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FIGURE 1 
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returned to the original position until the experiment terminated. 3 Within a session the 
equilibrium prices in the low demand and high demand periods differed by $.30, and 
the equilibrium volumes were 21 units and 27 units, respectively. Across sessions the 
predicted equilibria differed by the constant shift parameter. 
Thirteen different individual supply functions were distributed among 22 suppliers 
in any given period of any session. Thus weighting each of these functions by the number 
of suppliers holding it and then summing across functions yield the market supply func-
tion. The numbers below the market supply function S(x) in Figure l indicate the 
appropriate individual supply schedule to which units at that value belong. Thus, the 
marginal cost schedule implicit in schedule l is $1.80, $2.00, $2.40, and $3.20 for units 
one through four, respectively. Each of the 13 functions can be deduced from S(x) in 
a similar fashion. For example, the holders of schedule 7 are the marginal sellers during 
low demand periods, and those holding schedules 8 through 13 are extra marginal in 
these periods. 
Six different individual demand schedules were distributed among eleven different 
demanders. The value of each of these individual functions can be obtained from the 
aggregate demand D(x) as follows. Above the aggregate in Figure 1 are numbers that 
indicate the individual demand function that has a limit price at that value. Thus in-
dividual demand schedule l has one unit at each of the limit price levels $3.60, $3.30, 
$3.00, and $2.50. Other functions can be deduced similarly. 
During a given market session agents did not have the same individual schedule in 
all periods. Instead t.he schedules were rotated so that the aggregate demands and supplies 
were constant; but the situation from an agent's point of view was changing slightly from 
3 The exception is session I, in which demand was initially held constant for five periods and shifted up 
for three and then the experiment ended. The extra period in the first part of this session is listed as a period 
0 and was included to allow for learning about the technology of trading, the accounting rules, etc., which 
would be used in all subsequent sessions. 
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period to period. The word "slightly" is used because "small" agents, as described in 
the next section, remained small and large ones remained large throughout a session. 4 
4. Comparison of the laboratory market with the barge industry 
• Grain traffic along the upper Mississippi River and Illinois Waterway during the 
Autumn of 1970 was chosen as the subject market for the study. This market constitutes 
about 70% of all annual grain traffic and 35% of all annual dry bulk traffic in the United 
States excluding traffic along the Pacific coast. 5 The year 1970 was chosen because it 
has features typical of historical trends and because the data are available. Grain was 
chosen because the product is relatively homogeneous and thus is not characterized by 
a great number of special and idiosyncratic features that would complicate an experi-
mental design. We chose to study traffic during the Autumn since it is during this period 
that the industry is most active and is required to respond to changing market forces. 
The particular location of the industry was chosen for the same reasons. Thus we chose 
a relatively uncomplicated subsection of the barge industry that accounts for a large 
portion of the industrial traffic. 
Once we selected the section of the industry, we had three problems to solve. First, 
the relevant shapes of the market demand and supply functions had to be determined. 
Second, the distribution of firm sizes, costs, and demand characteristics had to be es-
timated. Since the data were limited to those generated in a single year, standard econ-
ometric techniques could not be applied. We relied on such sources and judgments that 
we could find. Third, we had to construct a "scaled down" industry that captured most 
of the important features of the actual industry. 
The following transformation expands our laboratory market to industrial size: 
one subject = 4 firms; 
one period = 2 weeks; 
one unit/period= 1/2 tow; 
one tow = 19. 5 million ton miles grain per month; and 
one tow per month in study region = l boat's capacity in study region 
= 5 boats' capacity in all regions. 
D Basic economic conditions. Most observers of the barge market, whether they are 
in government or in the industry, agree that both the demand function and the supply 
function in the dry bulk commodities' barge market are relatively "flat." On the demand 
side this is no doubt a result of the existence of substitute transportation modes, and on 
the supply side it is a result of the ease of entry. 
Ferguson et al. (1975) used a demand elasticity of two, but noted that an estimate 
as high as 3.9 was also obtained. The former was for all dry bulk, and the latter was 
for coal. Since the price of grain is less than that of many regulated goods and oil but 
is more than the price of coal, one would expect its elasticity to be bounded by the 
numbers 2 and 3.9 if the demand slopes are similar. Demand exhibits a pronounced 
seasonal component. During October and November, grain traffic resulting from North-
ern harvests becomes very heavy. Since prices of substitute transportation sources, truck 
and rail, are fixed, there is no reason to assume that the change in demand significantly 
4 The rotation schedule is available in Hong and Plott (1977 ). 
5 These figures reflect the percentage of total, selected dry bulk ton miles excluding shell, gravel, and 
rocks, and they are derived from Table 11-B-l of Smith (1976). The 70% figure includes the data from 
unspecified months. 
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changes the slope of demand. Thus we hypothesize that demand is elastic and relatively 
constant throughout the year except for the months of October and November when 
there is a substantial increase in demand. 
Less is known about the slope of the supply function, but it has received attention 
in Howe et al. (1969 ). Barges can be leased and boats can be obtained at a minimal 
capital outlay for operation at a small scale. In addition, evidence of economies of scale 
has been detected. The shifting demand for grain traffic in the study region provides 
some information about the slope of the supply function. A difference in volume from 
an August-September average of 1.18 million tons to an October volume of 1.625 million 
tons is accompanied by a shift in price from an average of 2. 725 mills/ton mile to 2.95. 
This implies a possible supply elasticity of 4.57 [since M/ b.P · P / X = (.445 /.225)(2.725 / 
1.18) = ( l.978)(2.309) = 4.57] in the range of equilibrium and a supply curve slope 
(b.P / M) of . 51 in these units. The fact that this seasonal component is fully anticipated 
as it occurs every year helps support an assumption that long-run supply behavior is 
being revealed about the "upper portions" of the supply function. 
Cost information helps give some feeling for the overall situation. Most estimates 
of the costs of water transport for this period are around three mills per ton mile (see 
Carr (1969), for example). Such estimates of line-haul costs were derived for the 
regulated firms reported in Gill and Whitten (1976). 6 These costs ranged from l.35 to 
about 5 mills per ton mile. These estimates, together with the fact that one mill was a 
lower limit on recorded prices (Friedlaender, 1969), lend support to the hypothesis that 
the supply function is bounded from below within the 1- 1.5 mill range. If we further 
assume that these low per unit variable costs were characteristic of the larger, more 
efficient firms with per unit overhead spread over a large number of units, the numbers 
also provide an upper bound estimate of the lowest points on the supply function. 
These estimates of properties of the demand and supply functions can be used to 
evaluate the parameters of the laboratory experiment when the latter are scaled to 
industrial size as shown in Figure 2 in the concluding section. The curve DD is the 
laboratory market demand during low demand months (2 periods= I month), and D'D' 
represents the two high demand months. The curve SS is the laboratory supply function 
with the units scaled and aggregated into months. Price and volume during the months 
of August and September are "close" to the theoretical equilibria of the laboratory 
market with DD as the specified demand function . The price-volume pair in October is 
close to the laboratory model with D 'D' as the specified demand function. The relationship 
between the experimental parameters and the market aggregates is further revealed by 
the November and December data. Demand remains high during November (perhaps 
approximated by D'D'), but the supply function shifts back as barges are used for storage. 
The fall in quantity and increase in price as shown for November should therefore be 
expected. Supply remains short in December when demand slips back to normal (assumed 
to be DD), and the lowered price-quantity pair shown for December is the result. Supply 
begins to return to normal in January and February. The relationships seem to remain 
relatively stable throughout the remainder of the year. The laboratory market involves 
two months of normal demand (August and September) followed by two months of high 
demand (two Octobers) and then two months of normal demand (January and Feburary). 
The demand and supply slopes of the laboratory parameters are well within the 
ranges specified for the industry. The theoretical elasticity of demand is approximately 
3 near the equilibrium, and the theoretical elasticity of supply is 4.87 . The lower limit 
on supply price of 1.4 and the equilibrium values are all close to those of the industry 
for this period of time. 
6 The report gives both accounting data and a formula for computing line-haul costs. These estimates 
result from an application of the method to the individual firm data they report. 
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TABLE 2 
Size 
Class 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
A Comparison of Experimental Model Parameters and the Parameters at Industrial Scale: The Demand Side 
Size in units' 
purchased 
during low 
demand periods 
(one period 
= \6 month) 
3 
3 
3 
Parameters at Experimental Scale 
Subjects Market Share 
Schedules 
(see Total Units % of All 
Number Figure 2) Purchased Purchases 
--
2 {D,} 6 29 
1 {D2} 3 14 
2 {D,} 6 29 
2 {D.} 2 10 
2 {Ds} 2 10 
2 {06} 2 10 
Parameters at Industrial Scale 
Firm Size Industry 
Number of Volume in ton 
grain tows per miles per month 
month in in study region Distribution 
study region during low of Firms 
(one month demand months 
=two periods) (000,000) No. % 
3 58.5 8 18 
3 58.5 4 9 
3 58.5 8 18 
19.5 8 18 
19.5 8 18 
19.5 8 18 
% of Total 
Purchases 
--
29 
14 
29 
10 
10 
10 
1 These are equilibrium market purchases deduced from an application of competitive market theory. Other measures of size yield comparable percentage figures when applied 
uniformly across subjects. 
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D Industrial organization. During the period, between 50 and 60 shippers were in 
operation. They were fairly evenly divided between large and small shippers with the 
larger ones being about three times the size of the smaller. The exact number and .sizes 
of shippers are not recorded so that these estimates were provided by carriers. The 
opinions of several individuals were sought, and they were all in general agreement. 
As shown in Table 2, the laboratory market at industrial scale has 44 shippers with 
the largest 45% accounting for 72% of the grain business. Large firms are all about the 
same size. Small firms are also all about the same size, and each of them is about 
one-third the size of a large firm. These figures are similar to the opinions of indus-
trial experts. 
Comparisons between the structure of supply in the laboratory market and the 
supply structure of the barge industry can be made from Table 3. The 22 subjects cor-
respond to 88 firms at industrial scale, while according to the DOT ( 1973 ), the industry 
had 93 firms. Size distribution and market share comparisons are complicated because 
many firms operate in several areas in addition to the study region, and size data are 
available only at the firm level. In expanding the laboratory market to industrial scale 
we assumed that a capacity of one boat in the grain business in the study region implied 
a capacity of five boats in total for all users and all regions. 7 We have thus assumed that 
the size distribution of the industry applies to this market. 
One discrepancy between the actual market and the laboratory market seems to 
occur with the number of large firms. Nine percent of the firms are in the class of largest 
firms in the laboratory market, and only 2% were detected in this class from the listings 
in the DOT study (1973). In this instance we think the estimates derived from the DOT 
are too low, as subsidiaries are reported there as independent firms and the methods used 
in the DOT study did not anticipate this possibility. Thus, the proportions as represented 
in the laboratory market may be more accurate than they appear. 
Prices in the industry are set as a result of individual negotiations, which are private. 
Frequently negotiations are made by phone with contracts signed by mail. Information 
about contract prices and contract opportunities differs among individuals and firms, 
depending upon their situation and their efforts to obtain information. The organization 
of negotiated price sessions in the laboratory market was an attempt to capture these 
features. Negotiations were bilateral and by phone. Information about contracts was 
costly. With so many participants, lines were frequently busy, and if a subject used the 
phone to negotiate or to seek information, s/he was forgoing opportunities to make 
contact with those who wished to trade. Thus, information conditions concerning price 
patterns in the laboratory market were not at all perfect. Some subjects had absolutely 
no idea about the price deals other subjects were able to get. 
The posted price laboratory markets represented the proposed policy for the barge 
industry. The policy would require carriers to post their prices with the ICC from 15-
30 days before a price change. Information conditions in the laboratory market were 
probably much better than those that one could anticipate from the policy applied to 
the industry. All participants were made aware immediately, accurately, and costlessly 
of all price changes in the laboratory market. In this sense the laboratory posted price 
markets were free of many of the problems that might occur in actual practice. 
5. Experimental results 
• The results are easy to summarize. The posted price policy causes higher prices, 
reduced volume, and efficiency losses. Furthermore, the posted price policy works to the 
7 Recall that our region accounts for only about 35% of all annual dry bulk traffic in the United States 
excluding the Pacific coast. 
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TABLE 3 A Comparison of Actual Experimental Model Parameters, the Parameters at Industrial Scale, and Industry Statistics: The Supply Side 
Parameters at Experimental Scale Distribution of Firms Rough Estimates of Industrial Statistics 
Size in 
units1 sold 
during low 
demand 
periods 
(one period 
Size :::: l/2 
Class month) 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 'h 
Subjects 
Number 
12 
Individual 
Schedules 
(See 
Figure I) 
{S,. S,} 
{S,} 
{S,} 
{S,} 
{S6-S13 } 
Market Share2 
Tota l 
Units Sold 
6 
%of All 
Sales 
29% 
29% 
10% 
15% 
19% 
Number 
of grain 
tows per 
month in 
study 
region 
(one 
month 
= two 
periods) 
v, 
Firm Size 
Average ton 
miles of 
grain per 
month in 
study region 
during low 
demand 
months 
(000,000) 
58.5 
39.0 
19.5 
19.5 
6.5 
Tota l 
number 
of boats 
in all 
regions 
15 
10 
5 
5 
1213 
Industry 
Derived from DOT Study (1973)' 
% of total 
grain Firm size 
tonnage in in terms 
study area of 
Number of (%total number 
Firms grain tows of boats Number % of 
in study in all of Total 
No. % region) regions Firms Number 
8 9% 29% '2o l 5 2 2% 
12 14% 29% 10- 15 9 10% 
8 9% 10% 4- 10 5 5% 
12 14% 15% 4- 10 13 14% 
48 55% 19% <4 64 69% 
1 These a re equilibrium sales deduced rrom a n application or the competitive market theory. Other measures or size yield comparable percentage figures when a pplied uniformly across subjects. 
2 This refors to total units sold during low demand periods by all subjects in the class as dictated by an application or the competitive ma rket theory. 
Judgments of Industry Experts' 
Firm 
size in 
terms of Number % of 
number of Grain 
of boats Firms Market 
20% 
15- 20 12- 15 
30% 
4- 15 15- 20 
Unknown 
3 or less many 
3 For each or the 93 firms responding to the questionnaires listed in Appendix D.1.1 in Smith (1976) additiona l sources such as DOT (1973) and Ferguson et al. (1975) were checked for clues to relative firm sizes. From these estimates 
a rough estimate or the numbers or "large" and "medium sized" firms were obtained. The number or small firms constitutes the residual. 
4 Various individuals in government, the industry and universi ties were asked about the total number or firms on the Mississippi and associated waterways and their relative sizes. The estimates reported here a re a summary or their opinions. 
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disadvantage of most market participants, especially the small ones, and helps only the 
large sellers. In this section we review in detail the data that lead to these conclusions. 
The posted price policy causes higher prices (Table 4 ). After adjusting for the 
constant differences that existed across sessions, the mean price is higher in the posted 
price markets than in the negotiated price markets in every period. Combining periods 
l through 4 in sessions l and 4, we see that the prices average near or below equilibrium, 
while in the posted price sessions 2 and 3, prices average $. l 5 above the equilibrium 
(which implies 6% above the $2.70). When demand shifts up, both types of markets 
adjust, but prices remain relatively higher in the posted price markets, even though 
during these periods they are closer to the competitive equilibrium than are the prices 
in negotiated price markets. The fall in demand which occurs in period 9 is accompanied 
by a rapid adjustment in the negotiated price market relative to that in the posted price 
markets. Average price in the negotiated price market is $.I 0 above equilibrium (about 
4% above the $2.70), and in the posted price markets it is $.23 above equilibrium (about 
9% above the $2. 70). Prices in the posted price markets have a lower variance, but are 
uniformly higher. 
Volume data are in Table 5. In any given period, with the exception of period 5, 
volume is always higher in the negotiated price markets than it is in the posted price 
markets. Furthermore, the differences are not small. In general, volume is from 20 to 
30% higher in the negotiated price market. 
This higher volume in the negotiated price market is attributable to two factors. 
First, the high prices fostered by the posted prices tend to choke off some demand. For 
the high demand elasticity case alone, one would expect that 5% higher prices would 
result in volume decreases of 15% or so. Hence, higher prices in the posted price markets 
account for part of the differences. Second, the volume in negotiated markets tends to 
be above the competitive equilibrium level. Small sellers are able to take advantage of 
the imperfect information conditions and sell high cost units at prices that would not 
exist under conditions of perfect information. Thus, the relatively high variance of prices 
in the negotiated markets as compared with the price variance in the posted price markets 
adds to the volume of the former and works to the advantage of the smaller, less efficient 
sellers. 
The performance of laboratory markets can be described by a measure closely tied 
to traditional concepts of economic efficiency. Markets are efficient if the allocations are 
Pareto optimal or maximize consumers' plus producers' surpluses. Gains from exchange 
are exhausted. This occurs in laboratory markets if and only if the subjects maximize 
their combined profits from the experiment. The actual total profit subjects take as a 
percentage of the maximum possible total profit is a measure we shall call the market 
efficiency level or simply efficiency. 
Market efficiency can be less than 100% for two reasons. First, some trades may 
not take place even though they are to the advantage of all parties. Various individuals 
may be willing and able to trade but fail to trade because they are unaware of each 
other, because strategic postures lead to no trades (monopoly and oligopoly are standard 
examples), or because technical complications prevent trading (e.g., the posted price 
institution reduces flexibility). Second, efficiency will be reduced if the wrong units get 
traded. Units with a high cost should not be sold if lower cost units go unsold as a result. 
The same applies on the demand side: units should not go to those who place a low value 
on them if the units can be placed where they have a higher value. 
Table 6 summarizes the performance of the two market forms in terms of efficiency. 
Posted price markets are in general less efficient than negotiated price markets. Price 
posting causes prices to be set too high, thereby preventing some trades, and the posted 
prices reduce flexibility. This is reflected in the low efficiencies during the first low 
demand periods in which the combined average efficiency of the two posted price markets 
This content dow
nloaded from
 131.215.23.238 on Tue, 25 Feb 2014 18:50:48 PM
A
ll use subject to JSTO
R Term
s and Conditions
N 
----
>-l 
TABLE 4 Comparative Average Price Behavior ::r: [Tl 
l:D 
Session [Tl 
r 
r 
2 3 4 ...... 
(Negotiated Price) (Posted Price) (Posted Price) (Negotiated Price) 0 c:: 
~ 
Mean Mean Mean Mean z 
Comp. Minus Comp. Minus Comp. Minus Comp. Minus > r 
Equil. Mean Std. Comp. Equil. Mean Std. Comp. Equil. Mean Std. Comp. Equil. Mean Std. Comp. 0 
Period $ $ Dev. Equil. $ $ Dev. Equil. $ $ Dev. Equil. $ $ Dev. Equil. 'Tl 
[Tl 
() 
0 2.70 2.52 .392 - .18 0 
1 2.70 2.58 .310 - .12 6.40 6.42 .385 .02 3.80 3.82 .349 .02 7.50 7.51 .416 .01 z 
2 2.70 2.65 .303 - .05 6.40 6.56 .246 .16 3.80 4.01 .171 .11 7.50 7.53 .332 .03 0 ~ 3 2.70 2.67 .244 - .03 6.40 6.61 .193 .21 3.80 4.01 .094 .21 7.50 7.57 .296 .o7 ...... 
4 2.70 2.65 .240 - .05 6.40 6.56 .114 .16 3.80 3.98 .055 .18 7.50 7.63 .280 .13 
() 
rJJ 
5 3.00 2.90 .261 - .10 6.70 6.60 .162 - .10 4.10 4.05 .109 - .05 7.80 7.75 .347 - .05 
6 3.00 2.91 .295 - .09 6.70 6.64 .177 -.06 4.10 4.06 .110 -.04 7.80 7.71 .293 - .09 
7 3.00 2.88 .288 - .12 6.70 6.71 .137 .01 4.10 4.07 .092 - .03 7.80 7.74 .281 - .06 
8 6.70 6.72 .145 .02 4. 10 4.08 .097 -.02 7.80 7.77 .265 -.03 
9 6.40 6.71 .110 .31 3.80 4.03 .077 .23 7.50 7.59 .210 .09 
10 6.40 6.70 .076 .30 3.80 3.99 .094 .19 7.50 7.60 .226 .10 
11 3.80 3.98 .059 .18 7.50 7.61 .253 . 11 
12 3.80 3.94 .067 .14 7.50 7.59 .206 .09 
Average: 
Low Demand 2.61 - .09 6.54 .14 3.96 .16 7.56 .06 
High Demand 2.90 - .10 6.67 --.03 4.07 - .03 7.74 -.06 
Low Demand 6.71 .31 3.99 .19 7.60 .10 
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TABLES Volume: Predicted and Actual for All Periods 
Sess ion 
Comp. Comp. Comp. Comp. 
Eq. Actual Eq. Actual Eq. Actua l Eq. Actual 
Period Quant. Quant. % Quant. Quant. % Quant. Quant. % Quant. Quant. % 
0 21 21 100 
21 22 105 21 12 57 21 14 67 21 25 119 
21 24 114 21 14 67 21 17 81 21 24 114 
21 23 110 21 13 62 21 17 8 1 21 23 109 
21 23 110 21 18 86 21 17 81 21 22 105 
27 30 ill 27 29 107 27 28 104 27 28 104 
27 30 Ill 27 28 104 27 29 107 27 30 111 
27 30 111 27 27 100 27 27 100 27 30 111 
27 27 100 27 26 96 27 30 I II 
21 14 67 21 16 76 21 23 110 
10 21 15 71 21 18 86 21 23 110 
11 21 17 8 1 21 22 105 
12 21 17 81 21 23 110 
Negotiated Posted 
Units % Comp. Eq . Units % Comp. Eq. 
Average low demand periods 23 109% 15 75% 
Average high demand periods 30 110% 28 103% 
is 78.4% as compared with 90% for the negotiated price markets. This is further em-
phasized by the very high efficiencies of the posted prices (a 97.6% average as compared 
with 92.5% for the negotiated markets) during the high demand periods. Prices were too 
high, but when the temporary demand increase occurred, they were just about right. The 
effects of lack of flexibility then become clear when demand again falls back to normal. 
Efficiency of the posted price markets averages 81.6% as compared with the 95.3% of 
the negotiated price market. Notice that the recovery of the negotiated price market is 
almost immediate, while the posted price market is only beginning to recover after four 
periods. 
The final dimension of comparison between the two modes of organization is dis-
tribution. Relative to the competitive model, the posted price organization hurts the small 
traders, while the negotiated price market helps the small traders. The reason for the 
latter stems from the imperfect information in the negotiated price market. Small, less 
efficient sellers who would be excluded from the market under perfect circumstances 
manage to take advantage of the fact that buyers are not perfectly informed in the 
negotiated price market and make some sales. In the posted price markets, these same 
small sellers are almost completely excluded even though prices are higher than com-
petitive levels. Exactly why the reduced total quantity seems to fall differentially on the 
small sellers is not obvious. 
These distributional effects can be seen most easily in terms of the number of units 
sold by small sellers and in terms of relative profits. From Table 7, one sees that during 
low demand periods small sellers tend to sell twice as much in the negotiated price 
markets as they do under the posted price institutions. When prices are negotiated, the 
market share for small firms tends to be somewhat higher than the 19% (low demand 
periods} and 30% (high demand periods) predicted by the competitive mode. This reflects 
the advantage provided them by the incomplete information. On the other hand, their 
market share shrinks below the competitive level during low demand periods when the 
posted price policy is implemented. 
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TABLE 6 Comparative Efficiency 
Session 
2 3 4 
(Negotiated (Posted (Posted (Negotiated 
Period Price) Price) Price) Price) 
0 81.6% 
I 98.6% 69.8% 71.7% 83.0% 
2 92.5% 76.4% 89.6% 88.9% 
3 93.4% 70.7% 79.2% 90.1% 
4 94.8% 84.0% 85.8% 89.2% 
5 93.2% 98.6% 94.8% 87.7% 
6 96.0% 98.0% 98.6% 87.3% 
7 95.2% 97.7% 96.2% 90.1 % 
8 99.4% 97.2% 95.8% 
9 71.2% 81.6% 96.2% 
10 80.7% 85.8% 95.8% 
II 87.7% 94.8% 
12 92.4% 94.3% 
Average First Low 
Demand Periods 92.2% 75.2% 81.6% 87.8% 
Average High 
Demand Periods 94.8% 98.4% 96.7% 90.2% 
Average Second Low 
Demand Periods 76.0% 87.1% 95.3% 
Overall Average 93.16% 84.65% 88.47% 91.1 % 
TABLE 7 Units Sold by Smallest Twelve Sellers (Class E in Table 3) 
Session 
2 3 4 
% Total % Total % Total % Total 
Units Units Units Units 
Period Number Sold Number Sold Number Sold Number Sold 
0 5 25 
l 5 22 I 8 2 14 9 36 
2 3 14 2 14 2 12 6 25 
3 5 22 2 15 4 24 6 26 
4 5 22 3 18 5 28 5 23 
5 II 37 10 34 10 36 7 25 
6 II 37 9 32 10 35 10 33 
7 9 30 9 33 8 30 10 33 
8 8 30 8 30 10 33 
9 4 24 2 13 5 22 
10 l 6 2 10 5 22 
II 4 24 4 19 
12 2 II 5 22 
Average Low Demand 
Periods 4.6 21 2 14 3.25 20 6.5 28 
Average High Demand 
Periods 10.3 35 6.5 32 9 33 9.3 31 
Average Low Demand 
Periods 2.5 15 2.5 15 4.8 21 
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TABLE 8 Profits in Dollars• Earned by Smallest Twelve Sellers (Class E in 
Table 3) and Largest Two Sellers (Class A in Table 3) 
Small Sellers Large Sellers 
Class E Class A 
Session Session 
Period 2 3 4 2 3 4 
0 2.75 2.88 
I 2.13 1.25 2.25 3.63 2.38 4.25 4.63 4. 13 
2 1.88 1.75 1.50 3.68 3.55 9.25 7.00 4.75 
3 1.80 2.50 2.50 4.5 3 3.40 7.38 9.38 6.00 
4 1.63 3.38 2.35 2.88 4.88 6.75 5.08 7.00 
5 5.13 3.88 4.75 7.38 6.30 9.75 9.70 7.75 
6 5.60 5.48 4.00 7.88 5.13 9.75 10.80 8.13 
7 3. 13 6.58 3.98 7.50 7.13 10.88 10.80 8.75 
8 5.98 3.75 7.38 10.88 9.25 9.00 
9 3.50 1.25 2.63 10.75 7.75 8.50 
10 1.00 .50 3.68 5.00 10.65 7.75 
II 1.88 2.63 8.63 6.63 
12 .23 2.78 9.30 5.88 
• Each I¢ profit in experiment = 2.5¢ in U.S. currency. 
Profit figures appear in Table 8. In only two periods (periods 4 and 9) are the profits 
of the small sellers in a posted price session higher than their profits in the corresponding 
periods of negotiated price sessions, and in all but four periods small sellers' profits in 
negotiated price markets dominate their profits in the posted price markets. On average, 
small sellers made $4.04 per period when prices were negotiated, but this shrinks to 
$2.90 in the posted price markets. The shift from negotiated prices to posted prices 
resulted in a 28% reduction in income for small sellers. On the other hand, the largest 
two sellers were helped by the posted price policy. For them profits in the posted price 
markets dominate profits in the negotiated price markets in almost every period. These 
two large sellers made $6.00 per period on average in the negotiated price markets, but 
their profit increased by 42% to $8.53 with the change to a posted price policy. 
Much of the distributional effect can be summarized by estimates of the percentage 
of small suppliers that would have been driven from the market by a price posting policy. 
The annual average volume per period of all small firms in the laboratory market was 
6.2 units in the negotiated price market and 3.6 units in the posted price market. 8 Even 
at the higher prices generated by the posting policy, the low volume would have been 
sufficient to cover the annual cost of only about 60% of the small firms that could 
successfully operate in the negotiated price market. Thus, the price posting policy would 
have eliminated about 40% of the small firms. 
6. Conclusions 
• In laboratory markets that have many of the essential economic features of the barge 
industry, rate filing policies have very pronounced and undesirable effects. They cause 
higher prices, lower volume, a reduced efficiency, and they hurt the small participants. 
8 ( 4.6 + 6.5 + 4.8 ) ( 10.3 + 9.3)-
.8 3 + .2 2 - 6.2 
( 2 + 3.25 + 2.5 + 2.5 ) ( 6.5 + 9) 
.8 4 + .2 - 2- = 3.6 
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The experimental results are translated to the industry level and presented together 
with the actual industrial data in Figure 2 and Table 9.9 Prices in posted price markets 
are from 5 to 9% above prices in the negotiated price markets. Volume during low 
demand periods is considerably less, by 25 to 30%, for posted price markets. During high 
demand periods, posted prices and volume appear to be in line with competitive theory, 
but this is actually an illusion. The posted prices were excessively high at the time of 
a demand increase; and because the institution is so cumbersome and slow in adjusting, 
prices stayed "about right" for the high demand periods. 
The high prices in posted price markets are accompanied by a loss in efficiency of 
5 to 15%. The combined effect is a social loss and a diversion of 20 to 30% of the annual 
grain traffic, worth about $44 million, to trucking and railroads. 
This loss of volume falls most heavily upon the small sellers. As many as 40% could 
be forced out of business. Naturally, since prices are generally higher, all shippers are 
hurt by the posted price policy. Ironically, the policy would hurt most those whom some 
claim it would help. 
With these conclusions the big question remains: To what extent can one rely upon 
the experiences generated in simple laboratory markets as indicators of what will happen 
in the larger, more complicated markets? Experimentalists in the physical sciences face 
the same type of question, and it cannot be answered without actually implementing the 
policy in the barge industry. Similarly, laboratory results in the physical sciences must 
be given field tests before reliability can be ascertained. From a scientific point of view, 
we have solid evidence only that price posting markets do not necessarily operate better 
than negotiated price markets under the parametric conditions we considered. From a 
FIGURE 2 
MONTHLY PRICE - VOLUME DATA: INDUSTRY AND EXPERIMENTAL AT INDUSTRIAL SCALE 
lJ.J 
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•BARGE INDUSTRY DATUM 
o EXPERIMENT - NEGOTIATED PRICE * 
D EXPERIMENT - POSTED PRICE * 
* THESE DATA ARE THE AVERAGE OF THE TWO EXPERIMENTS WITH 
THE APPROPRIATE MARKET ORGANIZATION. EACH MONTH IS TWO 
PERIODS WITH PERIODS 1 AND 2 REPRESENTING AUGUST. 
0.52 0.78 1.04 1.30 1.56 1.82 2.08 2.34 
MILLION TON MILES 
2.60 
9 Each experimental period represents two weeks so that a price-volume pair of experimental data, rep-
resenting a month, in the illustration is the average price over two experimental periods and the total volume 
over the two periods. The volume was transformed to industrial scale by application of the transformation 
introduced in Section 4. 
This content dow
nloaded from
 131.215.23.238 on Tue, 25 Feb 2014 18:50:48 PM
A
ll use subject to JSTO
R Term
s and Conditions
TABLE 9 Laboratory Price and Volume Statistics at Industrial Scale 
Session 
2 3 4 
Experimental Volume* Million Volume Million Volume Million Volume Million 
Period Corresponding Ton Miles per Av.* Ton Miles per Av. Ton Miles per Av. Ton Miles per Av. 
Number Month Two Weeks Price Two Weeks Price Two Weeks Price Two Weeks Price 
0 819 2.52 
Aug. 858 2.58 468 2.72 546 2.72 975 2.71 
2 936 2.65 546 2.86 663 2.91 936 2.73 
3 Sept. 897 2.67 507 2.91 663 2.91 897 2.77 
4 897 2.65 702 2.86 663 2.88 858 2.83 
5 Oct. #1 1170 2.90 1131 2.90 1092 2.95 1092 2.95 
6 1170 2.91 1092 2.94 1131 2.96 1170 2.91 
7 Oct. #2 1170** 2.88* 1053 3.01 1053 2.97 1170 2.94 
8 1053 3.02 1014 2.98 1170 2.97 
9 Jan. 546 3.01 624 2.93 897 2.79 
10 585 3.00 702 2.89 897 2.80 
II Feb. 663 2.88 858 2.81 
12 663 2.84 897 2.79 
* The low demand conditions lasted for five periods during the first session and the high demand conditions lasted only three periods. The first period of the first session is 
regarded here as a learning period. The remaining periods were not run because of logistical difficulties the first evening. 
** These figures are simply repeated to get numbers for a second two weeks for October #2 for session no. 1. 
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policy point of view, this evidence presumably shifts the burden of proof to the price 
posting advocates, who must now identify the specific features of the barge industry 
which, if incorporated in the experiment, would reverse the conclusions. 
Appendix 
• Instructions are as in the appendix to Plott and Smith (1978) with this section 
replacing the corresponding section. 
D Market organization. The market for this commodity is organized as follows. We 
open the market for a trading period (a trading "day"). The period lasts for __ _ 
minutes. Any trader is free to telephone any other trader at any time during the period 
to discuss trade possibilities. When a buyer and a seller agree to trade a single unit at 
a price, a contract is in order. (Note that trading is permitted only between a buyer and 
a seller.) Each party is to say to the other the following : "I now have a contract at 
(price) with trader (number) at (time)." A contract is consummated only after both 
parties have made the above statement (i.e., there is no binding contract if the formal 
statement has not been said). All contracts are for a single unit. 
After a contract is made, the buyer and seller will record the time of the contract 
and the contract price to be included in their earnings on the record sheets. There are 
likely to be many unsuccessful discussions, but you are free to keep trying, and, as a 
buyer or seller, you are free to make as much profit as you can. 
Are there any questions? 
D Final observations 
l. Each individual has a large envelope. All papers, instructions, records, etc. should be 
put into this envelope. Leave the envelope with us before leaving tonight. Take nothing 
home with you. 
2. We are able to advise you a little on making money. First, you should remember that 
pennies add up. Over many trades and a long period of time very small amounts earned 
on individual trades can add up to a great deal of money. Second, you should not expect 
your earnings to be steady. You will have some good periods and some bad periods. 
There will be some good nights and some bad. During bad times try not to become 
frustrated. Just stay in there and keep trying and earn what you can. It all adds up. 
Some people rush to trade. Others find it advantageous to "shop" or spread their 
trading over the period. We are unaware of any particular "best" strategies and suggest 
that you adapt accordingly. 
3. You are free to call anyone you wish, say anything you want, and gather any infor-
mation you can from any source you wish. However, under no circumstances may you 
mention anything about activities which might involve you and other participants after 
the experiment (i.e., no physical threats, deals to split up afterwards, or leading ques-
tions). Furthermore, agreements to fix prices or otherwise restrain trade are strictly 
prohibited. 
4. Each individual will be paid in private. Your earnings are strictly your own business. 
(Added for Posted Price.) 
During the next periods each seller is required to make all his sales at the fixed price 
of his choice. He must set his price (entered on the appropriate line below) before the 
period starts and leave it there until the period ends. 
Buyers are free to buy all they want (or can) from any seller. 
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